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THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION AND POST SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT 
Doaa S. Abdou*, Zeinab Zaazou 
Modern Sciences and Arts University (MSA), Egypt 
Abstract:  
The Egyptian revolution carries a challenging transition phase, starting out with 
problems such as low foreign direct investments (FDI), a high budget deficit, a high debt 
rate, a high unemployment rate, a high poverty rate, and a low standard of living. In 
addition, the budget deficit is expected to rise from 8.1% in 2009/10 close to 10% in 
2010/11, as the interim government boosts spending to offset the impact of the political 
unrest. The temporary supply shortages that followed the upheaval, coupled with rising 
international prices of food and fuel have been adding to the pressure on the domestic 
price level since early 2011. Thus the inflation  rate is expected to increase from 11.7% in 
2009/10 to 13.4% in 2010/11. This paper tries to answer the following questions: How 
long will the transition period last? What are the drastic impacts on the political/economic 
conditions (after revolution), and also the social/sociological environment in Egypt? And 
what about these impacts within the governance framework? What effect does all that 
have on neighbourhood countries? At last, what are the solutions and remedies that can 
be suggested to overcome this period and start a new flourishing era? We are aiming to 
tackle these important topics and examine them through theoretical and descriptive study, 
hoping to come up with adequate answers and solutions. 
Keywords: Political, socioeconomic problems, governance, revolution 
JEL Classification: O10, O11, O21 
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1. Introduction: 
Many developing countries suffer from the increasing levels of social inequality, weak 
public corporate governance, limited competition, lack of a well-structured public sector, and 
pervasive corruption during the last ten years. The unequal earning destroyed the lives of the 
poor and spread poverty and slums. In Egypt the people had reached a point of indignation that 
had a well-founded sense of social injustice and discontent. Egypt suffered from corruption, 
bad economic performance, and an absence of political parties. Egyptians used to adapt with all 
these economic stresses without any complains, but Egyptian youth did not accept all these 
imbalances, and they decided to go for a change. Anger and hate motivated them not to return 
home unless they changed their destiny.  
The Egyptian revolution occurred based on the increased disconnect among citizens; they 
were oppressed as a minority from a group of businessmen. In addition, the increased level of 
poverty was followed with an increase level of food prices, while the gross domestic product 
per capita increased by 2% (WDI, 2010). The young Egyptian revolutionary is marked by a 
drastic wave of anti-authoritarian movements toward social correction. Egypt is witnessing a 
transition period marked with uncertainty, characterized by political transition accompanied 
with economic risks. There are many reasons behind the Egyptian revolution, such as the latest 
parliamentary elections where Islamist groups were eliminated; an incident that made the 
people loses confidence in the regime. Moreover, the corruption and deteriorating socio-
economic conditions, the cruelty of police and its troubling presence, and the high prices of 
basic goods and services also led to a loss of confidence. The following sections one and two 
are designed to assess the impact of the Egyptian revolution on the political level, followed 
with the socio economic effects. The third section focuses on the impact of the Egyptian 
revolution on neighboring countries, and ends with conclusion and recommendations.  
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2. The Egyptian Revolution, Political Level Problems and Governance:  
Political stability and economic growth outcome are deeply interrelated. On the political side, 
there are many reasons that trigger the bullet to revolution, such as the thirty years of Mubarak ruling 
through emergency law, the control of El Watany party on political rights and civil freedoms, and 
lack of free and fair elections. Moreover, police brutality against activists, (namely the case of 
Khaled Said) wide spread corruption, the spread of virtual-opposition through social networking 
websites helped generate the upheaval. The political environment in Egypt was known in all the 
declarations of constitutional and constitutions interim that followed the 1952 revolution up to the 
permanent constitution in 1971, as amended, and until the 25
th
 of January revolution, as a mixed 
system (in form or constitutional). Any system that combines some characteristics of parliamentary 
systems in addition to some of the characteristics of presidential systems is called „a mixed system.‟  
Studies examined the role that the constitution in an organized nation has at explaining cross-
country differences. The Egyptian revolution has results in a prolonged political transition, as 
there are difficulties evident in the government‟s process of defining a clear and creditable 
guideline for political and economic reform. 
2.1 Democracy and Parliamentary Election 
    The year 2010 in Egypt ended with a very controversial parliamentary election that caused 
mounting uproar over a “legitimacy crisis” and gross allegations of fraud. The poor political 
performance combined with high level of corruption led the government to collapse and created 
political instability. This parliamentary crisis of 2010 was the fuel that caused a widespread 
uprising on January 25 and protests over political reform and social inequity, the political 
upheaval was well received internationally and domestically as the transformation would set 
the first stage for a real democratic system in Egypt. The move towards democracy in Egypt 
starts with a controversial parliament; post-Mubarak political risk in Egypt will remain as the 
Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party remains the most dominant political force in 
the new assembly, and will have a great deal of influence in drafting the country's new 
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constitution. Underlying tensions between parliament and the military have yet to be resolved, 
and may prove to be a major source of conflict further down the line.  
In line with our core view, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) has 
emerged as the most powerful political force in Egypt following elections to the lower house of 
parliament. The FJP's coalition securing approximately 235 out of the 508 seats up for grabs, or 
approximately 46% of the total.(1) The primary task of Egypt's new parliament will be to 
nominate a 100-member assembly that will be tasked with writing a new constitution. In this 
sense, far from being trivial, this parliament will have a crucial role in shaping the broad 
contours of the country's future political institutions. (2) As a result, although there has been a 
significant amount of coverage over who may decide to run for the presidency, by the time the 
vote comes around (which we expect in June), the outcome will most likely have little impact 
over actual policy formation.  
The parliamentary system means the President of the Republic will enjoy limited or 
honorary power and concentrated tasks. The executive power will be in the hands of the Prime 
Minister, who requires the existence of strong political parties sharing power and 
responsibilities among themselves. Unfortunately this is not the case in Egypt now, and 
probably won‟t find place in the coming future. As a result, the mixed system which combines 
the characteristics of parliamentary system and the characteristics of presidential system, 
named “Albarlamasa,” may be the most suitable system for Egypt in the coming period.  The 
legislative power holds the right of the inquisition, its application and activation of practice, 
                                                          
(
1
) The big winner from the country's first post-Mubarak election was the Salafist Al-Nour Party, which won 123 
seats, or 24% of the total. A collection of secular and liberal parties, including New Wafd and the Egyptian Bloc 
coalition, managed to win a little under 10% of the vote respectively, with the remaining seats being taken up by a 
variety of smaller parties. 
(
2
) A clear division of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government will likely be the most 
prominent features of the post-Mubarak constitution in our view, and we expect to see a greatly diminished role for 
the president in the first instance. Indeed, although an array of views and ideologies are represented in the new 
parliament, we believe one of the main commonalities among the major parties is to see a legislature with greatly 
enhanced powers. 
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including the possibility of withdrawal of confidence from the government or the executive 
branch, according to the 1971 constitution. (3)  
The President‟s responsibilities are determined by the constitution, and this depends on the 
political system applied in the country. In addition, the functions and powers exercised by the 
President of the Republic jointly with the prime minister, are also referred to in the constitution 
of the Republic. The prime minister and ministerial relations and responsibilities are derived 
from the constitution itself and are not derived from the President of the Republic.  In Egypt the 
relation between the executive and legislative branches in the mixed system requires strict 
constitutional limitations in terms of realism, and multiple centers of decision-making between 
the President, Prime minister, and Parliament, (see a more detailed explanation in the appendix) 
which prevents the control of one person or institution alone on the political process.  
The political transition period after the revolution will last until the Egyptians become 
mature enough to transfer to democracy and create a real liberal leadership which is a necessary 
foundation to liberal democracy. Although we expect that the first free presidential elections in 
the history of Egypt will produce more respect to the point of view of the opponent, this will 
not stop the conflict between the new leadership and the Islamists, the issue will maintain 
throughout the transition period. 
2.2 Governance Post Revolution: 'The Political Level'  
During the transition to a democracy from an authoritarian regime, the state should 
undergo major public administration reforms. Considering the shift of the relation between the 
state and its citizens from control to responsiveness, the state‟s administrative apparatus must 
                                                          
(
3
) As the activation of these specialties control makes government more tightly controlled by parliamentary 
practices and not only from a constitutional standpoint or a theory.  It also highlights the subject of continuity of 
Shura Council and if its continuation is required to increase its functions and specialties so that it works 
harmonically with the legislative power
 
Accounting for the President of parliament and ministers in the case of 
abuses. It also requires, in my view the text on the rules of legislative and constitutional to ensure accountability or 
the Present and Minister in the event of irregularities as soon as they occur and so as not to delay the accounting 
until the exit of the minister of the ministry, but to be accounting for the offense as soon as they occur, which 
prevents the personalization of power and without the tyranny of the executive or legislative authority to call it.  
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also undergo major shifts. Good governance has several characteristics. It is participatory, 
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective, efficient, equitable, 
inclusive, and follows the rule of law. At a minimum, good governance requires fair legal 
frameworks that are enforced impartially by an independent judiciary, and requires that its 
decisions and enforcement are transparent or carried out in a manner that follows established 
rules and regulations.  
Egypt has shown a decline in governance indicators, reflecting the need for institutional 
reforms as a pre-condition for building democracy during transitional phases, and it allows for 
the inclusion of the citizens in the decision-making process. This fundamental reform during 
transitions seeks to develop local self-government institutions and to increase overall quality 
and effectiveness of the state‟s governance system. Consequently, increase in the authority and 
capacities of sub-national government levels. In addition, decentralization, when appropriately 
structured, provides an arrangement through which critical issues such as national unity and 
indivisibility are countered; it ensures local development and equity in the distribution of 
resources, and hence local autonomy can be realized.  Decentralization‟s aim is based on the 
subsidiary principle of bringing decisions closer to the beneficiaries at the most effective level 
of local government, and, therefore, increasing effectiveness, transparency, and curbing 
corruption (Salwa Tobbala, 2010).  
3. The Egyptian Revolution, Socio-Economic problems and Governance:  
The Egyptian revolution carries a challenging transition phase faced with low foreign 
direct investment, a high budget deficit, a high debt rate, a high unemployment rate, a high 
poverty rate, and a low standard of living. Real gross domestic product growth rate is expected 
to be only 1.6% in 2010/11, down from 5.1% in 2009/10, see table 1. Economic Growth 
estimated to be between 1.7% and 2.5% for the rest of the fiscal year 2010/11. 
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Table 1- Egyptian Macroeconomic Indicators 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 (p) 2012 (p) 
Real GDP growth  7.2 4.7 5.1 1.6 5 
CPI inflation  11.7 16.2 11.7 13.4 12.2 
Budget balance % GDP -6.8 -6.6 -8.1 -9.8 -9.4 
Current account % GDP 0.8 -2.3 -2 -3.2 -2.9 
Source: Data from Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) and CAPMAS: estimates (e) and prediction 
(p) based on authors’ calculations. Fiscal year July (n-1)/June (n). 
3.1 Tourism  
The tourism sector is one of the country‟s economic pillars; Egypt in 2010 had 14.7 
million tourists, but after January 25th tourism revenues dropped by 60 percent. Hotel 
occupancy rates decreased in the first four months of this year by 16 percent compared with the 
same time in 2010. Tension, destabilization and sectarian sedition lead to the drop in tourist 
reservation by 20 percent during January. Egypt has lost around two billion U.S. dollars in 
tourism revenues due to this political unrest, according to official estimates earlier this month. 
Moreover, revenues from exports and the Suez Canal were not as affected as the tourism sector. 
Tourism has been negatively affected throughout the region, where the drop in arrivals was 
close to 45 percent in the first quarter of 2011 (World Bank 2011a). 
3.2 Foreign exchange reserves: 
The Egyptian foreign exchange reserves have been dropping rapidly, as they were $36 
billion pre-revolution and $15 billion post-revolution. The decline was sparked by the dramatic 
events in Egypt, which took their toll on the receipts of foreign currencies. Tourism revenues 
dwindled by 47.5 percent in the second half of the year, compared with the first. Moreover, for 
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the first time, FDI registered a negative record low of US$ 65 million, whereas the portfolio 
investment unfolded a net outflow of US$ 7.1 billion, (CBE, annual report 2011). 
3.3 Foreign Investment: 
Foreign investment in Egypt deteriorated after the revolution from 6.8 to 2 USD Billion 
for the fiscal year 2010/11. The main indices of Egypt‟s stock exchange (EGX 30 and EGX 
100) both dropped by 10.5% and 14% after the revolution, (ECES, June, 2011). As well as the 
growing deficit in trade balance, which exceeded the 28 billion dollars in 2011, and the fall in 
foreign direct investment is less than 2 billion dollars after they had crossed the $113 billion a 
few years ago (CBE, Annual report, 2011).  
Compounding the seriousness of the matter forced the government to expand borrowing 
through issues treasury bills and bonds until it reached total borrowing up to 119 billion, an 
increase of 158% from last year, which means crowding out the government to the private 
sector to get credit.  These investment developments have negatively affected the banking 
institutions where they reduced internationally operating banking in Egypt credit rating. 
Moreover, Egypt recorded a significant decrease in the numbers of private investment, 
domestic and foreign; in light of the apparent lack of stability and internal security as well as 
blurred vision official of the state under the rule of military and is the successive governments 
present, and lack of homogeneity in trends. As well as the absence of disciplines, overlapping 
of responsibilities and the inability of Parliament to prove his ability to play the role expected 
of it. This has become clear in the cycle of decline in numbers of private investment (domestic 
and foreign direct).  
3.4 Debt crisis  
The debt represents 15.2 % GDP; this indicator comes among the best global levels, 
which ranged between 15.3% for the developing Asian economies and 66.0 % for North and 
Central European countries. Moreover, the indicator of debt service/exports of goods and 
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services recorded 5.7 %, i.e. less than the global levels forecast for 2011 that ranged between 
11.0 % for Sub-Saharan Africa and 55.8% for North and Central Europe, according to the 
IMF‟s World Economic Outlook (IMF‟s World Economic Outlook - Sept. 2011). On the 
demand side, the slowdown in economic growth was primarily due to lower share of capital 
formation (including the change in stock) that registered a negative 0.8 point (against a positive 
1.6 point). An extra factor at work was the decline in the share of net external demand (exports 
of goods and services less imports of goods and services) that shifted from a positive 0.1 point 
to a negative 1.0 Point. Moreover, the rise in the share of private consumption (3.2 points 
against 2.9 points) made up for the weak contributions of the above items. 
Figure1: Share of Demand Components in Real GDP Growth Rate 
 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, annual report, 2011. 
3.5 Balance of Payments and External Trade 
There are two basic factors that contributed to the overall deficit: the current account 
deficit which retreated by 35.9 percent to a record US$ 2.8 billion (against US$ 4.3 billion a 
year earlier), and the capital and financial account that unfolded a net outflow of US$ 4.8 
billion (against a net inflow of US$ 8.3billion). The decline in the current account deficit was 
brought about by the fall in trade deficit, the increase in net unrequited transfers, and the 
contraction in services surplus ( see table 2- in the appendix).  
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The trade deficit narrowed by 5.3 percent to US$ 23.8 billion (against US$ 25.1 billion), 
reflecting the rise in merchandise exports by 13.1 percent to US$ 27.0 billion, and a 
comparatively moderate rise in merchandise imports by 3.6 percent to US$ 50.8 billion. 
Services surplus went down by 23.8 percent to US$ 7.9 billion (against US$ 10.3 billion in the 
previous FY), due to the retreat in services receipts by 7.2 percent, combined with a rise in 
services payments by 5.8 percent, as illustrated below: 
- Services receipts fell by 7.2 percent to US$ 21.9 billion. Services receipts were mostly 
responsible for the decline: travel receipts(tourism revenues) decelerated by 8.6 percent to only 
US$ 10.6 billion, other services receipts shrank by 27.8 percent to US$ 2.7 billion, and 
investment income receipts almost halved by 49.5percent to register US$ 418.8 million. 
However, transportation receipts went up by 11.8 percent to US$ 8.1 billion due to the 11.9 
percent increase in Suez Canal earnings to US$ 5.1 billion. 
- Services payments augmented by 5.8 percent to US$ 14.0 billion due to the rise in investment 
income payments by 24.5 percent to US$ 6.5 billion, and transportation payments by 12.7 
percent to US$ 1.4 billion. In the meantime, government expenditures fell by 27.9 percent to 
US$ 1.1 billion, travel expenditures by 9.2 percent to US$ 2.1 billion and other services 
payments by only 0.5 percent to stand at US$ 2.9 billion.  On the other side, In FY 2010/2011, 
the volume of trade expanded by 6.7 percent, registering US$ 77.8 billion (Against US$ 72.9 
billion a year earlier). The uptrend came on the back of the 13.1 percent increase in export 
proceeds to US$ 27.0 billion (oil exports rose by 18.3 percent and non-oil exports by 9.1 
percent). Imports increased as well, albeit at a slower pace than exports (3.6 percent), to 
register US$ 50.8 billion, reflecting the rise of 15.2 percent in oil imports and the fall of 2.3 
percent in non-oil imports. 
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3.6 Unemployment  
In the past 20 years Egyptian unemployment was fluctuating at a rather high level (8–12%). 
However, after the launch of economic reforms in the mid-2000s it started to decrease in a rather 
stable manner. Predictably, there was some increase (though not so pronounced as in most other 
countries) in unemployment level as a result of the global financial economic crisis, but in 2010 
unemployment went down again, see figure 2. This increase in unemployment is one of the most 
significant issues in the short run because the increase in unemployment will result in to further 
reduction in production levels, and it will increase the burden on governments as they will increase 
government expenditure to pay more unemployment benefits, resulting in a drop in economic 
performance (Farid, 2011). 
Figure (2): Unemployment rate and employment to population ratio during  1999 to 2010 
 
Source: World development indicator, 2011 
Egypt's unemployment rate in the last quarter of 2010 was 9.5 percent; it has risen to 
11.9 percent in the first quarter under the impact of the political unrest (CAMPAS, 2011).  The 
World Fact book estimated a 3.2% increase in the unemployment rate in Egypt to currently be 
at a level of 12.2% instead of 9% just a year ago; this shows the shocking effect that the Arab 
Spring has had on Egypt‟s unemployment rate (Hagen, 2011).  
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3.7 Inequality  
The Gini index is most frequently used for measuring the level of economic inequality. 
Egypt had the following dynamics of Gini index, see figure 3. Thus, inequality index in Egypt 
was fluctuating around 30–33 points. Let us view how this low level of economic inequality 
inherent to Egypt compared against the global background is connected with a very specific 
character of Egyptian poverty which is one of the main causes of youth Egyptian revolution. 
Figure 3- Economic inequality in Egypt during 1991- 2005 
 
 Source: World Development Indicator, 2011 
3.8 Poverty and Subsidies  
The common  notion is that 40% of Egyptians live below the $2 a day income poverty 
line. Remarkably, nobody mentions the Egyptian level of extreme poverty, i.e.: proportion of 
people living below $1 a day income poverty line. At the peak of world economic boom when 
Egypt recorded annual economic growth rates of 7.2%, the proportion of Egyptians living 
below $2 a day poverty line increased significantly from 17.8% to 23%. On the contrary, the 
global financial economic crisis was accompanied not only by economic growth rates 
slowdown, but also by a visible decrease in the proportion of Egyptians living on less than $2 a 
day, from 23% to 19.5% (Gamal Siam and Hanady Mostafa Abdel Rady, 2010). Global 
economic post-crisis recovery led to the blowing of new price bubbles in the world food 
market, almost reaching or even exceeding the peak levels of 2008. Basing on the model by 
Gamal Siam and Hanady Mostafa Abdel Radi, we expect that the proportion of Egyptians 
living below the $2 a day income poverty line should have reached the 2008 level by the start 
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of the Egyptian Revolution, see figure (4). In spring 2008 the protests against food price growth 
surged in Egypt. The central event was the strike of spinning and weaving factory workers in 
the industrial city of “Almahalla Alkubra” which started on the 6th of April, 2008. The 
worker‟s dissent was aimed first and foremost at the decrease of living standards caused by 
food price growth. Egyptian bloggers supporting the strikers launched a Face book group called 
the “April 6 Youth Movement”. It is known that this movement played a crucial role in the 
Egyptian Revolution 2011. Still more important was social self organization through Face book 
which was first successfully tried in spring 2008 by this youth movement and proved its 
efficiency in 2011 events (Andrey Korotayev and Julia V. Zinkina, 2011). 
Figure 4: Proportion of population living below $2 a day income poverty line, Egypt, %, 
1991- 2010 
 
Source: World Development Indicator, 2011 
To overcome the poverty problem, the Egyptian government use subsidies to ease the 
burden of poverty. The Egyptian government spends more than $15 billion a year on energy 
subsidies, and can‟t cut any percentage of this spending, otherwise it may face harsh public 
opposition. The temporary supply shortages that followed the upheaval coupled with rising 
international prices of food and fuel have been adding to the pressure on the domestic price 
level since early 2011. Thus the inflation rate is expected to increase from 11.7% in 2001/10 to 
13.4% in 2010/11. Similarly, the current account deficit is expected to widen from 2.0% of 
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GDP in 2009/10 to 3.2% in 2010/11 and then fall to 2.9% in 2011/12 as FDI inflows, 
remittances and the services balance remain vulnerable.  
The Egyptian system of subsidies mitigated the strike blown by global food price rises 
to the poor. Indeed, the system does not cover all necessary food commodities. Besides, the 
average Egyptian family having a ration card bought at a subsidized price about 60% of its 
consumed sugar, 73% of oil and 40% of rice. The rest of these goods the family had to buy at 
market prices that are much higher than the subsidized ones, (El Nakeeb A.M., 2009). 
3.9 Inflation  
The increasing rate of inflation has a significant impact on the time value of money 
(TVM), as banks and financial institution increase the interest rates to compensate the erosion 
of the value of money due to inflation over the term of the debt instruments they offer. Annual 
CPI inflation averaged 11.8 percent in 2009/10, see figure (5). The first half of 2010/11 (July-
December) witnessed relative stability in headline inflation rate (year-after-year). The monthly 
core inflation index accelerated in the first half of 2010/11 from 7.1 percent to 9.7 percent, 
driven by the rising prices of rice, poultry, edible oils and fats. Remarkably, there is 
convergence of the core and headline inflation rates.  
Figure (5) inflation in Egypt during the period 2010-Jan 2011 
 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, 2011 
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We believe that poverty and social injustice are the main reasons for the Egyptian 
uprising. Poverty is similar to terrorism and must be uprooted. The desperate poor people are 
also susceptible to radical beliefs that it is acceptable to kill anyone who opposes their 
interpretation of a religious text. Targeting the areas and residents living in abject poverty 
should be similar to how terrorist groups and strongholds are targeted. The sense of poverty is 
deepened by an inefficient economic system.  
4. Governance Post Revolution 
People in Egypt felt the huge gap between the poor and wealthy, which was reflected by 
imbalance of distribution of power and wealth. It also imposes unfair, unreasonable pricing that 
threatens social, political and economic stability. In addition, this imbalance led to increased 
unemployment, recession, poverty, and the wasting of wise leadership and citizenship rights. All 
the above-mentioned caused the Egyptians‟ uprising.  In case the government, private and 
nonprofit sector didn‟t take serious actions to solve the critical social economic conditions, these 
negative socioeconomic aspects will be more rooted in Egypt. Learning the lessons of 
industrialized states that have achieved economic progress and social prosperity around the 
world, from Asia to America to Europe, it is clear that a social economic market system that 
combines economic aptitude and social justice safeguards against the dangers and losses of a 
social uprising, and uproots poverty entirely.  
      The promotion of "civil society" has become one of the pillars of "good governance". The 
Arab countries, including Egypt, have also been concerned by this new approach to 
development. Thus, governments show their willingness to dialogue with civil society. At the 
same time, two phenomena appear today: on the one hand, a strengthening of the weight of 
civil society, under the impact of the process of liberalization of the media (independent 
newspapers, TV programmes, and new media), and on the other hand a diversification of civil 
society actors: NGOs, protest movements, action groups and various urban and rural groups. 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Vol. 15, No. 1, May 2013 
 
107 
 
These diverse actors rally around various causes and interests and contribute to partially modify 
the modes of governance and public action at the national and local level, and to the current 
renewals of the theories about civil society and politics in the framework of the changes 
brought about by globalisation to the states and the societies. 
Participatory mechanisms require acceptance by each party of the position and role of 
the other and agreement to cooperate, i.e. that Governments respect the independence of 
organizations, and organizations abide by the laws and regulations. It is no more feasible to 
make decisions or design and implement public policies through the top-to-bottom method of 
intervention. Therefore, participation in those decisions and policies requires appropriate 
mechanisms of communication and exchange of information and expertise, such as: 
decentralized institutions, joint councils, and the media, which constitutes a forum to promote 
dialogue and participation among social actors, Accountability, which leads to enhancing 
confidence and participation and mobilizing resources, and so on (United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Western Asia, 2012). 
Recommendations:  
We do believe the best thing to do is learning from other nations‟ successful 
experiences, such as the Malaysian development model. We believe that the country will go 
into a pitfall if they decide to borrow from international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank or the IMF. These institutions are in a position to extend financial help and for that help 
to be given, they expect certain obedience and certain submission to their way of doing things. 
These financial institutions are working to serve their own targets and own benefits. The World 
Bank let many southern countries down and refused their demands and protests over certain 
things. So, our country should start taking serious steps towards depending mainly on self-
finance that means depending on internal financial sources and empowering local industries by 
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issuing laws and regulations to minimize taxes and deregulate interest rates to encourage 
business people and manufacturers to be more productive through the following channels:  
1- Importance of safety and stability, they are essential to utilize human resources in order to 
enrich not only what it has internally, but also to bring in the raw material in order to add 
value. That‟s how counties become rich. In addition to empower local authorities to provide 
grants to the poor, affordable housing with quality to low income families, and housing at 
subsidized rents and prices.  
2- Importance of corporate governance as essential tool for development: a country may be 
rich in resources, but if people do not know how to exploit those resources, how to add 
value to those resources, then they are going to remain poor. Also to add value to resources 
there must be a government that is conscious of its duty to develop the country and that is 
knowledgeable about how to develop it. 
 
3- Solving slums problems to assure social security: People should be paid a flat rate of 
national insurance. In return, they and their wives should be eligible for flat-rate pensions, 
sickness benefit and unemployment benefit. Also personal social services should be 
provided by local authorities, such as: deprived children, elderly people, mentally 
disordered, and the handicapped. Nevertheless, providing financial support to households 
for raising children to combat homeless and street children phenomena.   
4- Correcting labor market working conditions: Improving conditions in workplace, workers‟ 
compensation, better retirement benefits, plus worker‟s rights regarding salaries and wages. 
5- National Health Service: Free treatment should be funded and offered by the National 
Health Service. Also funds should be allocated towards modernization and extension 
schemes aiming at improving administrative efficiency. Improvements should entail 
nursing, vaccinations, etc. 
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6- Education: Free secondary education should be provided. School leaving age should be 
raised and upgrading school buildings and prefab classrooms is a must. Improving 
instructor‟s payments as well as improving existing schools, modules, and education 
programs. 
7- Agriculture and Rural areas: Improving the quality of life in rural areas, security of tenure 
for farmers and others.  Issuing legislations for agricultural wages, and general subsidy 
system for farmers. Providing essential services such as: gas, electricity, water and 
transportation services. (As well as in leisure and public entities).  
8- Increase public industrial protectionism through increasing capital inflow to invest on 
national project. In addition, managing the exchange rate of local currency is very 
important. That helps the country to know what it gains and can help forecast its future 
earnings as well. The point is, that the western developed world have the control over 
currency speculation; they can speculate with any currency and their speculation is so 
designed that they can either revalue a currency or devalue a currency to any level. They 
hold this power by which they can make or break developing countries‟ economy. 
Conclusion: 
Neither fundamentalist socialism nor fundamentalist capitalism can achieve economic 
success or social justice. When the economic system works in the favor of businesspeople that 
are profit-driven, low income level suffer from poverty. Neglecting social and ethical 
responsibility and ignoring the rightful interests of all the parties affected by the business 
creates crisis. Unequal earning destroyed the lives of the poor and spread poverty and slums. 
Egypt suffered from corruption and bad economic performance, in addition to an absence of 
political parties.  The Egyptian revolution should be considered as an alarm for all other 
countries that adopt authoritarian system and ignore social factors.  
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Appendix  
The Relationship between the Executive
(4)
 and Legislative
(5) 
branches in the mixed 
system and the closest to the Parliamentary system, we view it should be as follows: - 
1- Plurality of centers of gravity in the executive and the terms of reference for the 
President involve pluralism in the executive branch to distinguish the clear and precise between 
the terms of reference of the President and the terms of reference of the Prime Minister and 
Minister. Which are derived from the Constitution itself and not derived from the President of 
the Republic? In addition to the functions and powers exercised by the President of the 
Republic jointly with the Prime Minister. 
2- Plurality of centers of gravity in the legislative and increase their competence. 
Moreover, to the tasks of law-making and budgetary control and so that it is for the Legislature 
the power of parallel (and perhaps beyond “Alssultha”, which means beyond authority) 
executive. Perhaps the most important aspect of these manifestations control of the legislative 
authority to the executive branch is the right of the investigation, its application and activation 
of practice. Including this implies the possibility of withdrawal of confidence from the 
government or the executive branch. 
(6)
 
                                                          
(4) The executive branch: The Egyptian political system established by constitution it‟s the party plurality, the political system is 
being a semi-presidential one. The judiciary power, the parliament, and the executive power are separated, the executive 
authority‟s actions being controlled by the parliament through several mechanisms. The executive power is represented by the 
president of Egypt, the local administration, the prime-minister, and by the minister‟s cabinet. 
  Executive Branch responsibilities: i) Executing or implementing public policy authorized by the legislative branch. ii) 
Proposing public policy( laws & regulations / preparing the budget)   
(5 ) The legislative branch (People assembly): The legislative power of Egypt is represented by the parliament which is made by 
the upper house -the "Shura" council and the lower house - the people‟ assembly. The people assembly has the right to dismiss the 
president if is guilty of criminal facts or of grand treason.  People assembly is consisted of 444 elected members & 10 selected 
members by the president himself. Also People assembly should control the executive branch, but unfortunately due to lacking of 
accountability, & weakness of the political power, bureaucracy becomes stronger than the legislative body itself. 
(6) As the activation of these specialties control makes government more tightly controlled by parliamentary practices and not 
only from a constitutional standpoint or a theory.  It also highlights the subject of continuity of “Shura” Council and if its 
continuation is required to increase its functions and specialties so that it works harmonically with the legislative power  
Accounting for the President of parliament and ministers in the case of abuses. It also requires, in my view the text on the rules 
of legislative and constitutional to ensure accountability or the Present and Minister in the event of irregularities as soon as they 
occur and so as not to delay the accounting until the exit of the minister of the ministry, but to be accounting for the offense as 
soon as they occur, which prevents the personalization of power and without the tyranny of the executive or legislative 
authority to call it.  
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3- Reducing the authority of the President of the Republic in the dissolution of Parliament:  
The importance of that stripped the President of the Republic (a top executive) of an important 
tool that can be used to intervene and influence the legislative power. In addition to the 
maintenance of determining the presidential term to four years and is renewable only once, and 
immunization of this provision in the new constitution. It is not capable of being modified by 
any president wants to launch an upcoming presidential term, or increasing the time period for 
the period one, it supports the role and independence of the legislative authority in the face of 
the executive branch. 
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Appendix: Table 2: Balance of Payments Indicators 
  Egypt's Balance Of Payments 
    
 
 
 
(US$ mn) 
  2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012* 
Trade Balance -25120.0 -27103.0 -31697.9 
   Exports 23873.1 26992.5 26975.9 
       Petroleum 10258.6 12135.7 13129.0 
       Other Exports 13614.5 14856.8 13846.9 
   Imports -48993.1 -54095.5 -58673.8 
Services (net) 10339.0 7878.4 5361.6 
  Receipts   23562.9 21873.1 20872.2 
      Transportation of which, 7216.5 8069.1 8585.0 
          Suez Canal 4516.8 5052.9 5207.8 
      Travel 11591.3 10588.7 9419.0 
      Investment Income 829.0 418.8 246.1 
      Government Services 217.9 117.7 276.2 
      Other 3708.2 2678.8 2345.9 
   Payments  13223.9 13994.7 15510.6 
      Transportation  1229.7 1385.3 1374.9 
      Travel 2327.5 2112.6 2497.6 
      Investment Income of which, 5193.7 6468.3 6948.6 
          Interest Paid 553.6 553.6 544.7 
      Government Expenditures 1534.5 1106.1 1151.9 
      Other 2938.5 2922.4 3537.6 
Balance of Goods & Services -14781.0 -19224.6 -26336.3 
Transfers 10463.4 13136.8 18408.0 
   Private Transfers (net) 9509.4 12383.9 17775.6 
   Official Transfers (net) 954.0 752.9 632.4 
Current Account Balance -4317.6 -6087.8 -7928.3 
   *  Preliminary 
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 (con.)  Egypt's Balance Of Payments 
  2009/2010* 2010/2011 2011/2012* 
Capital & Financial Account 8979.5 -4198.6 -1403.8 
Capital Account -36.2 -32.3 -96.0 
Financial Account 9015.7 -4166.3 -1307.8 
  Direct Investment Abroad -976.6 -958.0 -249.2 
  Direct Investment In Egypt (net)  * * 6758.2 2188.6 2078.2 
  Portfolio Investment Abroad -522.2 -117.7 -148.7 
  Portfolio Investment in Egypt (net)  7879.3 -2550.9 -5025.3 
         Bonds 1357.3 211.0 79.6 
  Other Investment (net)  -4123.0 -2728.3 2037.2 
      Net Borrowing 3004.1 1500.9 -101.5 
        M&L Term Loans (net)  80.1 -828.7 -682.7 
          Drawings 1835.3  1147.9  1290.0  
          Repayments -1755.2 -1976.6 -1972.7 
        MT Suppliers Credit (net) 11.5 -63.1 18.4 
          Drawings 103.3 72.5 104.4 
          Repayments -91.8 -135.6 -86.0 
        ST Suppliers Credit (net) 2912.5 2392.7 562.8 
  Other Assets -9669.1 -3427.1 1163.3 
     Central Bank -40.7 -64.3 28.0 
     Banks -2073.0 -1608.8 4365.7 
     Other -7555.4 -1754.0 -3230.4 
  Other Liabilities 2542.0 -802.1 975.4 
     Central Bank 1187.1 -44.0 993.5 
     Banks 1354.9 -758.1 -18.1 
Net Errors & Omissions -1306.2 532.5 -1946.3 
Overall Balance 3355.7 -9753.9 -11278.4 
Change in CBE's reserve assets (increase = -) -3355.7 9753.9 11278.4 
   *  Preliminary   
    ** Includes foreign direct investments in petroleum sector as from FY 2004/2005. 
  ..  Data series are set  according to the BOP fifth manual issued by the IMF in August 1993 
Source: Egyptian Centarl Bank, 2012 
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